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Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in 
 United States v. Windsor
Ernest A. Young and Erin C. Blondel*
In United States v. Windsor,1 the Supreme Court struck down Sec-
tion 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined 
marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman for purposes 
of federal law.2 On the same day, the Court decided Hollingsworth 
v. Perry,3 which involved California’s Proposition 8—a state provi-
sion, added by voter initiative to the California constitution, like-
wise prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriage. One question 
in these marriage cases was whether these two provisions should 
stand or fall together based on equal protection principles applicable 
to all levels of government in our system, or whether it made any 
difference that DOMA was a federal law. As it happened, Perry went 
away on standing grounds.4 But Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Windsor left little doubt that federalism principles were 
* Young is the Alston & Bird Professor at Duke Law School. Blondel is an associate 
at Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP. The authors were 
coauthors of the Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), available at http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2858. We are particularly grateful to 
our colleagues in that endeavor, Jonathan Adler, Lynn Baker, Randy Barnett, Dale 
Carpenter, Carina Cuellar, Roy Englert, and Ilya Somin, for their many helpful insights 
and staunch support, and to Bob Levy, Ilya Shapiro, and Gregg Strauss for comments 
on this essay. This commentary draws upon the amicus brief, but at least to some 
extent it reflects our own views that our co-signatories may or may not share. They 
deserve credit for the good parts but should not be blamed for any mistakes.
1 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2 Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7).
3 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
4 See id. at 2659. The standing holding in Perry raises an important federalism ques-
tion of its own concerning the extent to which state law may create interests sufficient 
to support standing in the federal courts. One of us has ventured some preliminary 
thoughts about that issue elsewhere. See Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge Fletch-
er—and of General Standing Principles, Ala. L. Rev. (forthcoming Fall 2013).
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crucial to the result. DOMA was unconstitutional not simply because 
it treated gay and straight couples unequally but because it intruded 
on the states’ sovereign authority to define marriage for themselves.
The extent to which federalism should affect these cases was con-
troversial before the Court’s decision,5 and the extent to which it ac-
tually did matter to the decision remains controversial in its wake.6 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissent (written in damage-control 
mode) argued that federalism was crucial to the majority’s decision, 
leaving the Court free to go the other way should a state prohibition 
on same-sex marriage come before it.7 Justice Antonin Scalia’s dis-
sent (written in outrage mode) dismissed Justice Kennedy’s invoca-
tion of federalism as mere window-dressing, designed to make the 
majority’s embrace of same-sex marriage more palatable to a skep-
tical public.8 Only time will tell who was right, of course. But we 
think that controversy over whether equal protection or federalism 
is the “best” or “truest” ground for invalidating DOMA misses the 
fundamental ways these two broad constitutional principles are per-
vasively intertwined. 
Most constitutional lawyers acknowledge (although it often slips 
their minds) that the Constitution’s structural features—federal-
ism and separation of powers—along with its rights and equality 
provisions secure the liberty of the people.9 Less well understood is 
that rights and structure intersect at the doctrinal level as well. The 
5 Compare George F. Will, DOMA Is an Abuse of Federalism, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 
2013, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-20/opinions/3787 
0263_1_doma-defense-of-marriage-act-general-police-power, with Linda Greenhouse, 
Trojan Horse, N.Y. Times Opinionator Blog, Apr. 3, 2013, http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/04/03/Trojan-horse.
6 E.g., Michael McConnell, Debating the Court’s Gay Marriage Decisions, The New 
Republic, Jun. 26, 2013, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113646/
supreme-court-strikes-down-doma-dismisses-prop-8-debate (“Justice Kennedy has 
sought to find a formula that enables him to invalidate the denial of same-sex 
marriage at the national level without doing so in every state. Federalism would have 
provided such a path, but he did not take it.”); Sandy Levinson, A Brief Comment 
on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor, Balkinization, Jun. 26, 2013, http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2013/06/a-brief-comment-on-justice-kennedys.html (writing off 
Windsor’s federalism arguments as “some blather about traditional state sovereignty 
and marriage”).
7 133 S. Ct. at 2696–97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
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Court’s opinion in Windsor beautifully illustrates that intersection. 
Federalism principles played a critical role in defining the contours 
of the equality right at stake, limiting which governmental interests 
could weigh against that right, and influencing the level of deference 
that the Court owed to how Congress had weighed those rights and 
interests. Rather than choosing between federalism and rights-based 
approaches to the case, Windsor demonstrated how federalism can 
become an integral part of the rights calculus.
It is already fashionable for Windsor’s admirers and detractors to 
dismiss Justice Kennedy’s opinion as “muddled” or “incoherent.”10 
This essay takes the radical view that the opinion’s reasoning is not 
only coherent but brilliant—the best explanation yet of how feder-
alism and equality doctrine intersect.11 Part I describes the contro-
versy over same-sex marriage and the litigation challenging DOMA. 
Part II discusses the doctrinal interconnection between federalism 
and equality in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. These doctrinal links are 
not the only, nor even the most important, connections between con-
stitutional structure and equality. But we think that Windsor dealt a 
blow not only to barriers to same-sex marriage but also to the doc-
trinal silos that have long constrained our constitutional thinking. 
I. DOMA and the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage
Federalism has structured our national conversation about same-
sex marriage. Beginning in the 1990s, some states put the issue on 
the national agenda by experimenting with same-sex marriage. Con-
gress enacted DOMA in 1996 to contain those experiments, both by 
10 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 6 (noting “the intellectual awkwardness of 
[Kennedy’s] opinion” and comparing it to “a camel (i.e., a horse designed by a 
committee)”); Andrew Sullivan, The Method in Kennedy’s Muddle, The Dish, Jun. 
27, 2013, http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2013/06/27/the-method-in-kennedys-
muddle/; McConnell, supra note 6 (“[T]he DOMA decision is a logical mish-
mash, portending more litigation and more instability.”); Tara Helfman, A Ruling 
Without Reason, Commentary, Jun. 26, 2013, http://www.commentarymagazine.
com/2013/06/26/a-ruling-without-reason (“In a 26-page opinion brimming with 
constitutional catch phrases but containing no coherent rationale, the Court delivered 
an outcome that many find politically favorable but that no serious reader could 
possibly find legally sound.”).
11 Although we like to think Justice Kennedy might have built on our brief, see 
Federalism Scholars, supra note *, his opinion contains much that we only wish we’d 
thought of first.
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ensuring that federal law and unwilling states need not recognize 
same-sex marriages and by raising the costs for states that might try 
same-sex marriage in the future. We strongly suspect that not only 
the states’ traditional primacy over marriage but also the Court’s re-
vival of constitutional limits on Congress’s enumerated powers dur-
ing the same period12 contributed to Congress’s decision not to go 
further and simply ban same-sex marriage across the board. One 
of federalism’s primary functions is to create institutional space for 
fundamental disagreements about visions of the good life.13
Similarly, when DOMA and state same-sex-marriage bans were 
challenged in court, the federal courts’ own federalist-style organiza-
tion allowed different federal courts of appeals to experiment with 
different visions of how federalism and equality interact. Given how 
the same-sex marriage issue percolated up to the Supreme Court, 
Windsor’s strong reliance on federalism should have surprised no one. 
A.  The Stunning Evolution of Public Opinion and American Law
Congress passed (with President Bill Clinton’s approval) DOMA 
in 199614 when the possibility that states might permit same-sex mar-
riage was only dawning on most Americans. Three years earlier the 
Hawaii Supreme Court had all but held that same-sex couples had 
a right to marry;15 many expected that Hawaii’s courts ultimately 
would recognize that right (they did). Most Americans first reacted 
skeptically: in 1996 27 percent of Americans supported same-sex 
marriage, while 68 percent opposed it.16 Their laws reflected that: by 
2000 about 40 states (including Hawaii) banned same-sex marriage 
by statute or constitutional amendment.17
12 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard 
of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L. J. 75, 136–40 (2001).
14 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419.
15 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
16 Marriage, Gallup.com, http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx (last 
visited July 29, 2013). All statistics about same-sex-marriage opinions in this essay can 
be found here.
17 Same Sex Marriage Laws, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/
issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx#2 (last visited July 29, 
2013).
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Other states, however, began experimenting with same-sex mar-
riage. From 2003 through 2009, the supreme courts of Massachusetts, 
Iowa, California, and Connecticut held, under their state constitu-
tions, that same-sex couples had a right to marry.18 Starting in 2009, 
several state legislatures permitted same-sex marriage; and in 2012 
voters began approving same-sex marriage in referenda.19
As of this writing, 13 states and the District of Columbia permit 
same-sex marriage, and similar legislation pends elsewhere. Twelve 
states and the District of Columbia permit civil unions or domestic 
partnerships that confer some or all rights that married couples en-
joy.20 About 35 states have adopted statutes or constitutional amend-
ments prohibiting same-sex marriage.21 Fifty-four percent of Ameri-
cans favor a right to same-sex marriage; 43 percent oppose it.
B.  Same-Sex Marriage in the Federal District and Circuit Courts
Perry and Windsor emerged from that ongoing evolution in public 
opinion and American law. 
Windsor was one of two cases in which a lower federal court struck 
down DOMA’s Section 3 on Fifth Amendment equal protection 
grounds. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, partners since 1963, married 
in Ontario, Canada, in 2007 and returned home to New York City.22 
New York state law recognized their marriage,23 but when Spyer died 
two years later, DOMA prohibited Windsor from claiming the mari-
tal exemption to the federal estate tax. Windsor paid $363,053 in estate 
taxes, then requested and eventually sued for a refund.24 Nancy Gill 
18 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
19 See Research Guides: Same-Sex Marriage Laws, The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/library/samesexmarriagelaws.php (last 
visited July 29, 2013).
20 Id. 
21 Same Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 17. These categories are not exclusive. Many 
states that permit same-sex marriage also allow civil unions or domestic partnerships, 
and some states that prohibit same-sex marriage nonetheless allow same-sex civil 
unions or domestic partnerships. See id.
22 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
23 At the time, most New York courts recognized out-of-state same-sex marriages; 
the state’s legislature legalized same-sex marriage in 2011. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
24 Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
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and other plaintiffs brought the second case in Massachusetts when 
they were denied federal benefits (in Gill’s case, the right to add her 
same-sex spouse to her federal health insurance) because of DOMA.25 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a companion suit, Mas-
sachusetts v. Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS), claiming 
that DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause.26
Unlike DHHS and Windsor, the Perry plaintiffs were not married 
under state law but argued that, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause, they were entitled to marry their same-
sex partners. The California Supreme Court had held in 2008 that 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state’s equal 
protection clause,27 but voters overruled that decision through a bal-
lot initiative, Proposition 8, amending the California constitution to 
permit only opposite-sex marriage.28 Between the California court’s 
decision and Proposition 8’s effective date, the state issued marriage 
licenses to over 18,000 same-sex couples.29 Two same-sex couples 
who sought but were denied marriage licenses after Proposition 8 
became effective sued the state to challenge the new law. 
In all three cases, at different points during litigation, executive of-
ficials refused to defend the constitutionality of DOMA and Proposi-
tion 8. The Obama administration concluded that gays and lesbians 
are a suspect class, laws burdening them are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, and DOMA failed that standard. California’s attorney gen-
eral conceded that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional; the other state 
defendants simply refused to defend it. Others intervened, however, 
to defend the enactments. The U.S. House of Representatives’ Biparti-
san Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) voted to defend DOMA and inter-
vened in DHHS and Windsor. Proposition 8’s proponents, led by then-
state-senator Dennis Hollingsworth, similarly intervened in Perry.
DHHS, Windsor, and Perry presented a spectrum of constitutional 
arguments. Most fundamentally, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions 
25 Gill v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379–83 (D. Mass 2010).
26 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). These cases were consolidated on appeal. 
Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (DHHS), 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
27 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
28 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 167–68 (9th Cir. 2012).
29 Id. at 1067–68.
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addressing laws aimed at gay relationships, Romer v. Evans30 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,31 (probably deliberately) obscured the constitu-
tional framework for analyzing such laws. What level of scrutiny 
applied, even what provision of the Constitution governed (equal 
protection or substantive due process) remained unsettled.32
Windsor and DHHS raised the additional question of how to treat 
federal laws addressing same-sex relationships. The Court had never 
addressed a statute burdening those relationships under the Fifth 
Amendment. And in DHHS litigants objected that the federal gov-
ernment had no business defining marriage at all.
But the biggest question was whether the Supreme Court was 
ready to flatly strike down gay-marriage bans. DHHS and Windsor 
left room for courts to rule on uniquely federal grounds and leave 
undisturbed state laws and amendments banning gay marriage. 
Perry, which directly challenged a state constitutional amendment 
approved by California voters under the U.S. Constitution, left less 
room for middle ground—though the Obama administration and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit tried to find it.33
BLAG offered a number of justifications for DOMA that, it said, at 
least met rational basis’s generous standard: DOMA preserved each 
sovereign’s (including the federal government’s) ability to define mar-
riage for itself; it ensured national uniformity of benefits; it preserved 
past legislative judgments and protected the public fisc; Congress 
wanted to proceed with caution before recognizing a new marriage 
form; and the federal government wanted to support traditional fam-
ilies and encourage parents to rear their biological offspring.34 The 
30 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
31 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
32 Whatever the virtues of this approach as a matter of judicial statesmanship, it in-
furiated a generation of law students, who could not tell what to put in their outlines.
33 The Obama administration proposed an “eight state solution” under which same-
sex marriage bans would be unconstitutional only in states that permitted civil unions 
or domestic partnerships with the same rights, but not the same title, as married cou-
ples. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013) (No. 12-144). This position laid an egg at the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Erin 
Fuchs, The Supreme Court Was Highly Skeptical of Obama’s Weird Gay Marriage 
Argument, Business Insider, Mar. 28, 2013. The Ninth Circuit’s solution is discussed 
below.
34 Merits Brief of Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group at 28–49, United States v. Wind-
sor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
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House report accompanying DOMA asserted that the statute de-
fended and nurtured traditional, heterosexual marriage; defended 
traditional morality; and preserved the public fisc.35
After the respective district courts invalidated DOMA and Propo-
sition 8, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Ninth 
Circuits affirmed, each on different grounds.
The First Circuit applied “a closer than usual review”36 (dubbed 
by BLAG’s counsel “rational basis plus”37) for two reasons. First, the 
court identified an open secret in Supreme Court jurisprudence: 
when statutes disadvantage unpopular minorities, the Court some-
times has professed to apply rational-basis review while conducting 
a more searching inquiry than it would for, say, a tax law. Second, 
the Supreme Court has shown less deference to legislative judgment 
when statutes undermine federalism and state sovereignty, such as 
in United States v. Lopez.38 DOMA raised both concerns—it uniquely 
burdened same-sex couples and intruded in an area of traditional 
state authority. Thus, the First Circuit applied somewhat more 
searching scrutiny to BLAG’s proffered justifications and found 
them inadequate. The court rejected the Tenth Amendment and 
Spending Clause arguments, however.
The Second Circuit took a more traditional path. The court held 
that intermediate scrutiny applies to denials of same-sex marriage 
because gays and lesbians are a discrete minority and have histori-
cally suffered persecution. The court then analyzed the rationales 
offered to justify DOMA and ruled that they did not survive inter-
mediate scrutiny. But it agreed with the First Circuit that the states’ 
primary authority over marriage was “a reason to look upon Section 
3 of DOMA with a cold eye.”39
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that Proposition 8 violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it withdrew a right to marry that 
state law had conferred on gay couples.40 Once the California Su-
35 Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (DHHS), 682 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 
2012). The report also said DOMA respected state sovereignty, obviously referring to 
Section 2 rather than Section 3. Id.
36 DHHS, 682 F.3d at 8.
37 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2012).
38 DHHS, 682 F.3d at 10–13. 
39 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181–86.
40 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1076–92 (9th Cir. 2012).
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preme Court ruled that the state constitution required allowing gay 
marriage, California voters could not rescind that right without a 
legitimate reason. These different approaches by the First, Second, 
and Ninth Circuits left the Court with a variety of models for view-
ing the relationship between state power and equality.
C. DOMA in the Supreme Court
In the fall of 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor.41 The Court heard 
both cases back to back in March and decided both on June 26, 2013. 
Perry had presented the cleanest, up-or-down constitutional chal-
lenge to same-sex-marriage bans. The Supreme Court dodged, dis-
missing the case on standing grounds.42 But the Court held that 
Windsor was justiciable and struck down DOMA’s Section 3 on nar-
rower, but still significant, grounds. Justice Kennedy wrote the ma-
jority opinion; Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel Alito dissented.
Like his opinions in Romer and Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s Wind-
sor opinion left much of the legal framework he was applying im-
plicit. But a framework is there, and the First Circuit’s decision in Gill 
provides a useful reference point. 
As the First Circuit did, the Windsor majority identified two re-
lated concerns: (1) states had chosen to recognize these marriages 
as they did opposite-sex marriages, and (2) the federal government, 
through DOMA, singled out some state-created marriages for disap-
proval. The majority also, like the First Circuit, essentially applied 
rational-basis-plus scrutiny. The Court conspicuously failed to adopt 
(or even mention) intermediate scrutiny. But it did not apply deferen-
tial rational-basis scrutiny either. It held, citing Romer, that DOMA’s 
“‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ especially require care-
ful consideration.”43
41 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2012); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
786 (2012). The Court held the petition in DHHS but ultimately denied certiorari, 133 
S. Ct. 2887 (2013), presumably because Justice Kagan was recused. See Lyle Denniston, 
Kagan, DOMA, and Recusal, SCOTUSblog, Nov. 2, 2012, http://www.scotusblog.
com/?p=154714. 
42 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
43 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691–93.
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The majority began with federalism. Traditionally, states have 
virtually exclusively governed family law, subject to constitutional 
limits. Though the federal government has power to decide who 
gets federal benefits, sometimes differently than state law would, 
the government has never before treated married couples within the 
same state differently. It has accepted state marital determinations 
and then decided who gets federal benefits.44
Though the majority declined to rule that DOMA exceeded the 
federal government’s powers, the states’ decision to include same-
sex couples in state-created marriages was nonetheless critical. 
That judgment is a “far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the in-
timate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by 
the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other 
marriages.”45 DOMA, however, rejects “the usual tradition of recog-
nizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” and “deprive[s] 
same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with 
the federal recognition of their marriages.”46 
Thus, once states decided to classify same-sex couples as married, 
the federal government decided to “use[] this state-defined class for 
the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities.”47 
The Court described those disabilities in philosophical and practi-
cal terms. DOMA’s “avowed purpose and practical effect,” as BLAG 
openly admitted, was “to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, 
and so a stigma” on state-recognized same-sex marriages.48 As a 
result, “DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the 
purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law,” 
which “diminish[es] the stability and predictability of basic personal 
relations” and “tells those couples, and all the world, that their oth-
erwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”49
The majority also cataloged ways that DOMA, practically speak-
ing, treated same-sex marriages as second class. Same-sex couples 
were deprived of federal benefits and protections in healthcare, 
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2692.
46 Id. at 2693.
47 Id. at 2692.
48 Id. at 2693.
49 Id. at 2694.
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bankruptcy, and taxation. Ethics rules and special protection did not 
apply to federal officials’ same-sex spouses. Parenting was more ex-
pensive for same-sex couples. Altogether, “DOMA divests married 
same-sex couples of the duties and responsibilities that are an essen-
tial part of married life.”50
Put simply, “[w]hat the State of New York treats as alike the fed-
eral law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the 
State seeks to protect.”51 “By doing so [DOMA] violates basic due 
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal 
Government.”52 
II. The Doctrinal Intersections of Federalism and Rights
After discussing the states’ preeminent role in defining marriage, 
the Windsor majority wrote that “[d]espite these considerations, it is 
unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power 
is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal 
balance.”53 Early commentators have read that line as conceding that 
the case wasn’t really about federalism—that the Court’s extended 
account of federalism was, as Justice Scalia put it, merely a “rhetorical 
basis to support its pretense that today’s prohibition of laws exclud-
ing same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government.”54 
This interpretation gives short shrift to Justice Kennedy’s statement 
immediately following that “[t]he State’s power in defining the mari-
tal relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from prin-
ciples of federalism.”55 The remainder of our essay explores what he 
possibly could have meant. 
A. The Enumerated Powers Argument That Wasn’t
The “principles of federalism” that Justice Kennedy decided the 
case “quite apart from” were traditional arguments about limits on 
the federal government’s enumerated powers.56 It is not surprising 
50 Id. at 2695.
51 Id. at 2692.
52 Id. at 2693.
53 Id. at 2692.
54 Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Helfman, supra note 10.
55 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
56 Id.
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that the Court did not analyze the case from that perspective, given 
that no court of appeals had relied on such an argument and the 
Court had granted certiorari only on the plaintiffs’ equal protection 
challenge. The Court did have an enumerated-powers argument be-
fore it, however, in the amicus brief filed by several federalism schol-
ars.57 Although the Court did not rely on that ground, developing 
that argument can make a useful foil for the federalism argument 
that the Court did adopt.
Of course, no specific enumerated federal power to define mar-
riage exists. Nor does DOMA fit under the Commerce Clause: al-
though weddings are often highly commercial (ask anyone who’s 
paid for one), marriage itself is generally not a commercial activity.58 
One can imagine federal marriage legislation under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But the Section 5 argument is asymmetri-
cal; it is very hard to say that it is unconstitutional for a state to rec-
ognize same-sex marriage, so there is no constitutional violation for 
DOMA to prevent or remedy by withdrawing recognition.59
The best arguments thus would have to maintain that defining 
marriage to exclude same-sex couples is “necessary and proper” to 
Congress’s exercise of its other enumerated powers to regulate com-
merce or spend federal money. That position is intuitively powerful, 
especially given the Court’s precedents recognizing broad federal 
power and adopting a deferential standard of review for necessary 
and proper cases.60 They don’t, in other words, call it the “Sweeping 
Clause” for nothing.61 But the Court has suggested in recent years that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is no longer a blank check allowing 
Congress to evade the limits on its specifically enumerated powers. 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,62 five justices 
rejected a Necessary and Proper Clause argument for upholding the 
57 Federalism Scholars, supra note *, at 11–25.
58 But see RussianBrides.com, http://www.russianbrides.com/mail-order-brides.
htm (demonstrating that particularly when it comes to sex, there’s a commercial 
version of almost everything).
59 Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
60 E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
61 See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L. J. 267, 270 n.10 (1993).
62 See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591–93 (2012) (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644–47 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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individual health insurance mandate, and some of the Court’s other 
recent Necessary and Proper Clause opinions have cautioned against 
reading the clause too broadly.63
The Court’s underdeveloped case law appears to impose three dis-
tinct requirements for valid legislation under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. First, such legislation must be “incidental” to the exercise of 
an enumerated power.64 Congress may employ unenumerated means 
so long as they are necessary and proper to the accomplishment of an 
enumerated end.65 But it does not allow pursuing unenumerated ends or 
using unenumerated means for their own sake.66 As Chief Justice John 
Marshall warned in McCulloch v. Maryland, “should Congress, under the 
pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of ob-
jects not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty 
of this tribunal . . . to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.”67 
Distinguishing incidental and primary purposes will often be hard. But 
sometimes Congress is not particularly subtle. It seems safe to say that 
a law entitled “The Defense of Marriage Act” regulates marriage for its 
own sake—not as an incidental way to make some other federal regula-
tory scheme more effective. And Paul Clement’s brief defending DOMA 
was candid enough to argue in precisely those terms.68
Second, also traceable to McCulloch, the unenumerated means must 
be “plainly adapted” to Congress’s enumerated end.69 That means 
63 E.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010); id. at 1970 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he term ‘necessary’ . . . requires an ‘appropriate’ 
link between a power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress. 
. . . And it is an obligation of this Court to enforce compliance with that limitation.”) 
(citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415). See generally Ilya Somin, Taking Stock 
of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 2009-
2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 239 (2010).
64 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (stating that the Necessary and Proper Clause “vests 
Congress with authority to enact provisions ‘incidental to the [enumerated] power, 
and conducive to its beneficial exercise’”) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 
418).
65 See generally Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956; David Engdahl, The Spending Power, 
44 Duke L. J. 1, 18–24 (1994).
66 See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411 (stressing that creating a corpora-
tion is “never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else”).
67 Id. at 423.
68 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
69 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope 
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
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the means and ends must fit, and the Court’s analysis is tradition-
ally deferential.70 But although McCulloch is often credited as origi-
nating the rational-basis standard, Justice Kennedy recently went 
out of his way to insist that the hyper-deferential post-1937 version 
of rational-basis review, employed in substantive due process and 
equal protection cases not involving fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications, does not apply to the Necessary and Proper Clause.71 
Rather, “[t]he rational basis [required] . . . is a demonstrated link in 
fact, based on empirical demonstration.”72
Demonstrating that link for DOMA would be difficult. The act de-
fines marriage to exclude same-sex couples in more than 1,100 differ-
ent federal statutes. A provision that applies shotgun-style to more 
than 1,100 federal laws is “plainly adapted” to none. Congress was 
not trying to improve the tax code or the immigration laws, for ex-
ample. Although those exercises of Congress’s enumerated powers 
do sometimes require the federal government to determine which 
state-sanctioned marriages it will recognize for specific federal pur-
poses, DOMA was not enacted for any such purpose.
Finally, unenumerated means must be not only “necessary” to 
achieving some enumerated end but also “proper.”73 In the Founding 
era, that meant that laws “must be consistent with principles of sepa-
ration of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights.”74 
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”).
70 But see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (cautioning that “deference in matters of policy 
cannot, however, become abdication in matters of law”).
71 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1966 (“This Court has not held that the Lee Optical test, 
asking if ‘it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational 
way to correct’ an evil, is the proper test in this context. Rather, under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, application of a ‘rational basis’ test should be at least as exacting as 
it has been in the Commerce Clause cases, if not more so.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)). We 
need not remind the gentle reader that Justice Kennedy might as well have a numeral 
“5” tattooed on his forehead for these purposes.
72 Id. (attributing this standard to “the Commerce Clause cases”).
73 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997); see also Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is of fundamental 
importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are 
compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”).
74 Lawson & Granger, supra note 61, at 297.
45307_CH06_Young.indd   130 9/6/13   10:51 AM
Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States v. Windsor
131
But that formulation—if it is to be more than tautological—is hard 
to unpack. In NFIB, the chief justice suggested that the individual 
health insurance mandate was improper because it extended federal 
power in a way that had no obvious stopping point.75 
For DOMA, the strongest argument is that Congress had ap-
propriated a power that is reserved exclusively to the states. And 
Congress’s intrusion on that power interfered with the states’ own 
exercise of their powers over marriage. First, it required state offi-
cials to disregard state law when administering federal programs. 
State officials administering veterans’ cemeteries, for example, had 
to exclude veterans’ same-sex spouses in spite of state law. Second, 
DOMA interfered with implementing and enforcing state law itself 
and imposed substantial costs on the states. For example, it made 
spousal-support orders between same-sex couples unenforceable 
in bankruptcy and precluded using garnishment procedures ordi-
narily available for monies in federal hands (such as income-tax re-
funds, or federal wages and benefits payments). It prevented state 
income tax regimes from “piggybacking” on federal forms, rules, 
and enforcement. And it increased the taxes that states as employers 
pay when they extend health insurance to same-sex spouses.76 These 
effects reflect DOMA’s fundamental purpose, which was to discour-
age states from adopting a definition of marriage that departed from 
Congress’s preferences.77
Some have suggested, however, that Congress always has the power 
to define terms in its enactments.78 Because this essay is primarily 
75 132 S. Ct. at 2588 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2646 (joint dissent); see 
also Jonathan Adler, Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. Roberts, in The 
Health Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications (Nathaniel 
Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013).
76 See Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note *, at 32–35.
77 See 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (DOMA’s purpose “is to discourage enactment of state same-
sex marriage laws . . . . The congressional goal was ‘to put a thumb on the scales 
and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws.’” (quoting 
Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12–13)). One might analyze many of these burdens as 
conditions on the federal monies and other benefits that states accept in order to 
participate in federal programs. From that perspective, however, DOMA probably 
could not validly apply to any programs that states elected to participate in prior to 
DOMA’s effective date. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–06 (striking down retroactive 
conditions on Medicaid participation).
78 See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Congress Has Power to Define the 
Terms of Its Own Statutes, Volokh Conspiracy, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.volokh.
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about the arguments the Court did address in Windsor, one of us has 
analyzed this argument for a broad federal “definition power” in a 
separate essay.79 Briefly, there are three basic answers. First, federal 
definitions for terms like “marriage” are hardly inevitable or essen-
tial. Federal law has traditionally taken state law as it found it with re-
spect to marriage and other basics of family law. Under DOMA, fed-
eral law continued to take state marriage law as it found it—except for 
refusing to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex marriages. Second, 
everything Congress does must be tied to an enumerated power. When 
Congress offers definitions for statutory terms, it is using the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause power, and its definitions—like everything 
else done under that power—still must be incidental, plainly adapted, 
and proper. Calling Congress’s action a “definition” changes nothing.
The third objection ties the Necessary and Proper Clause argu-
ments to the equal protection analysis, which the rest of this essay 
focuses on. Even if Congress can define its terms, Congress’s enu-
merated powers limit the range of interests that Congress may assert 
in support of those definitions when they are challenged under the 
Constitution’s rights and equality provisions. Congress might define 
“marriage” so that its statutes are intelligible, but it cannot assert 
an interest in maintaining the traditional institution of marriage in 
com/2013/03/06/congress-has-power-to-define-the-terms-of-its-own-statutes; 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, There Is No Federalism Objection to Section Three of 
the Defense of Marriage Act, Volokh Conspiracy, Mar. 24, 2013, http://www.volokh.
com/2013/03/24/there-is-no-federalism-objection-to-section-three-of-the-defense-
of-marriage-act; see also Ed Whelan, Badly Confused Amicus Brief on Federalism 
in DOMA Case, Nat’l Rev. Online, Mar. 5, 2013, http://www.nationalreview.com/
bench-memos/342256/badly-confused-amicus-brief-federalism-doma-case-ed-
whelan (offering a more ad hominem version of the same argument).
79 See Ernest A. Young, DOMA and the Limits of Congress’s Power to Define Its Terms, 
Case Western Res. L. Rev. (forthcoming Spring 2014). For shorter responses, see Ernie 
Young, DOMA and Federalism: What Are the Limits of Congress’s Power to Define 
Terms in Federal Statutes? A Reply to Whelan and Rosenkranz, Volokh Conspiracy, 
Mar. 7, 2013, http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/07/doma-and-federalism-what-are-
the-limits-of-congresss-power-to-define-terms-in-federal-statutes-a-reply-to-whelan-
and-rosenkranz; Randy Barnett, The Chief Justice’s Excellent Hypothetical: Under Our 
System of Federalism, Can You Be Both Married and Unmarried at the Same Time?, 
Volokh Conspiracy, Mar. 28, 2013, http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/28/the-chief-
justices-excellent-hypothetical-under-our-system-of-federalism-can-you-be-both-
married-and-unmarried-at-the-same-time; Jonathan H. Adler, A Final Response to Ed 
on DOMA, Nat’l Rev. Online, Apr. 1, 2013, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-
memos/344376/final-response-ed-doma-jonathan-h-adler. 
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response to an equal protection challenge. That is because maintain-
ing that institution is not itself within any of Congress’s enumerated 
powers. What Congress cannot do, in other words, is exactly what 
BLAG did in the Windsor litigation: assert that it has the same inter-
est as a state to define who can and cannot be married.
B. Federalism and Equal Protection
The Court did not, of course, reach these enumerated powers ar-
guments in Windsor. It decided the case on equal protection grounds, 
prompting not only Justice Scalia but also numerous commentators 
to discount the holding’s federalism element. That reaction, in our 
view, fundamentally misunderstands the majority opinion. Struc-
tural principles like federalism and separation of powers exist to 
protect individual liberty.80 We generally think of this protection in 
a macro sense: federalism, like separation of powers, helps form a 
system of checks and balances that makes it more difficult for either 
level of government to act tyrannically and provides institutional 
outlets for divergent views. But federalism also operates in a micro 
sense, shaping individual-rights doctrine. Justice Kennedy’s Wind-
sor opinion is, in fact, the best illustration we have of how structural 
analysis can—and should—inform individual rights.
Edith Windsor’s equal protection challenge to DOMA necessar-
ily included several elements. Unlawful discrimination occurs with 
respect to some right or interest, and the courts had to define that 
interest with some precision. BLAG offered particular governmental 
interests to justify DOMA, and the courts had to assess those inter-
ests. Finally, the courts had to determine the “fit” between the gov-
ernment’s interests and Congress’s means, which required deciding 
how much deference, if any, to show Congress’s judgment of that fit. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion demonstrates that federalism played a key 
role at each step of this analysis. 
1. Defining the Right
It seems natural to think of Windsor and Hollingsworth as cases 
about whether gay and straight people have equal rights to marry. 
80 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution 
divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of 
individuals.”).
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That is not quite correct. Hollingsworth, which challenged Califor-
nia’s prohibition of same-sex marriage, did raise that question. In 
Windsor, however, even BLAG did not argue that Edith Windsor and 
Thea Spyer were not lawfully married. All parties recognized that 
state law settled that point. The question was whether the federal 
government, through DOMA, could constitutionally refuse to rec-
ognize that marriage. Hence, the solicitor general framed the ques-
tion presented as: “Whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied 
to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws 
of their State.”81
 The last phrase is critical: Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were 
“legally married under the laws of their State.” They did not assert 
that justice or fairness entitled them to marry; they insisted that their 
state’s law had conferred marital status upon them and that Con-
gress could not treat some people with that status differently from 
others without denying equal protection of the laws. That struck a 
chord with the Windsor majority, which emphasized that “the State’s 
decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred 
upon them a dignity and status of immense import. When the State 
used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation 
in this way, its role and its power in making the decision enhanced 
the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own 
community.”82
The Court’s focus on the state’s determination that Windsor and 
Spyer could marry rather brilliantly dissolved what, in our view, 
has always been the dilemma at the heart of debates about same-sex 
marriage. At least since Loving v. Virginia, marriage has been recog-
nized as a fundamental right.83 It is hornbook law that governmental 
81 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment in United States v. Windsor, at I, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/12-307-Petition.pdf. 
82 133 S. Ct. at 2692. See also Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA 
Decision, Volokh Conspiracy, Jun. 26, 2013, at http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/26/
federalism-marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision (emphasizing this aspect of Wind-
sor).
83 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that anti-miscegenation laws violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause).
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classifications that burden or unequally allocate a fundamental right 
are subject to strict (and usually fatal) scrutiny. 
But strict scrutiny requires the government to discriminate among 
similarly situated people. Opponents of same-sex marriage contend 
that marriage just is—and has always been—an institution involv-
ing one man and one woman; hence, gay and straight couples cannot 
be similarly situated. Proponents, of course, disagree. It is not easy to 
resolve that debate without relying on one’s moral priors.84 
The Windsor majority, however, focused on the fact that the great 
state of New York had already resolved—and as a matter for federal-
ism, was entitled to resolve—that question through its own demo-
cratic processes. State law defined the class of similarly situated per-
sons for purposes of Windsor’s equal protection claim.85 As Justice 
Kennedy explained:
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints 
are those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made 
lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a class of persons 
deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to 
enhance their own liberty. It imposes a disability on the class 
by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be 
dignified and proper.86
That approach made Justice Scalia’s sturm und drang about democratic 
deliberation singularly inappropriate: the Court did not impose its 
own view of whether same-sex marriages should be recognized; it 
accepted New York’s.87
It is worth remembering that state law provides the predicate for 
federal constitutional claims all the time. Property interests, for ex-
ample, are generally a function of state law; hence, claims under the 
Takings and Due Process Clauses, as well as the Fourth Amendment, 
84 That is not to say that there is no right answer, either as a legal or a moral matter. 
Our point is simply that the question is a difficult one.
85 See 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (“DOMA contrives to deprive some couples married under 
the laws of their State, but not other couples, of both rights and responsibilities.”).
86 Id. at 2695–96.
87 Compare, e.g., id. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We might have covered ourselves 
with honor today, by promising all sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle and 
that we would respect their resolution. We might have let the People decide.”), with 
Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Laws 749 (codified at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law Ann. 
§§ 10-a, 10-b, 13) (2011) (deciding).
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often turn on whether the government has invaded an interest de-
fined by state law.88 Contracts Clause claims likewise require first 
establishing a valid contract under state law.89 In all these contexts, 
federalism provides a positivist alternative to some Platonic notion 
of “property” or “contract”—or “marriage.” The Constitution gives 
states authority to define those terms, and federal law takes state law 
as it finds it.90 
There are, of course, exceptions. State law definitions may not vio-
late the federal Constitution. Virginia’s power to define marriage did 
not save its anti-miscegenation law, which violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by discriminating on the basis of race.91 State prohibi-
tions on same-sex marriage, such as Proposition 8, might also violate 
that provision. But that is a harder question than whether Congress 
may refuse to recognize marriages that a state has already sanc-
tioned. Like property and contracts, state law defined and elevated 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer’s marriage.
The close connection between the state’s power to define marriage 
and the dignity of individuals is not simply theoretical—it is also 
highly practical and emotional. As the Federalism Scholars’ brief 
argued, “DOMA creates significant uncertainty with [the] private 
realm. It forces same-sex couples to live a divided life, married for 
state purposes but unmarried for federal ones.”92 Or, as Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg famously put it at oral argument, DOMA transforms 
88 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (noting “our 
traditional resort to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law’ to define the range of interests that qualify for protection 
as ‘property’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”) (takings claim) (quot-
ing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (due process 
claim)); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (holding that warrantless GPS 
surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment where it would amount to a trespass 
upon individual property interests).
89 See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
90 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David 
L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 459 (6th 
ed. 2009) (“Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. . . . Congress acts . . . 
against the background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way that a 
state legislature acts against the background of the common law, assumed to govern 
unless changed by legislation.”). We would add, of course, that Congress can only 
change the state law background by legislation if it acts within its enumerated powers.
91 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12.
92 Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note *, at 36.
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a “full marriage” into a “skim-milk marriage.”93 Same-sex married 
couples—like all married couples—justifiably rely on the solidity 
and permanence of state law’s recognition of their relationships. 
DOMA’s intrusion on those relationships threatens their well-being 
and undermines their dignity. As Edith Windsor said after Thea 
died, “In the midst of my grief, I realized that the federal govern-
ment was treating us as strangers.”94
Invalidating DOMA hardly ensures that state law will recognize 
all same-sex relationships. But ensuring that people can rely on state 
law to settle their family relationships without Congress interfering 
promotes notice, reliance, and political accountability.95 As Justice 
Kennedy put it, “DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the 
incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all 
married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject 
to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.”96 Whether 
or not Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer had a right to have New York 
recognize their marriage, once it did so they were entitled to rely on 
that decision.
2. The Government’s Interests
Federalism also constrained the interests that could justify DOMA 
by tightening the Court’s standard of review and prompting the 
Court to reject Congress’s primary interest outright. The Court sim-
ply ignored several of the interests that BLAG asserted, including 
an interest in maintaining a nationally uniform definition of mar-
riage for purposes of federal law and protecting the federal fisc.97 
The most plausible reason for the Court’s silence was that it did not 
think these interests had much to do with Congress’s actual purpose. 
Rather, the Court said, “The history of DOMA’s enactment and its 
93 Transcript of Oral Argument at 71, U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 
12-307).
94 Amy Davidson, The Skim Milk in Edith Windsor’s Marriage, The New Yorker, 
Mar. 28, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/03/edith-
windsors-victory-doma.html. 
95 See Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note *, at 36 (arguing that “DOMA blurs 
lines of political accountability for this intrusion, particularly when state officials must 
administer federal rules that do not respect marriage rights under state law”).
96 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
97 See BLAG Brief, supra note 34, at 28–49 (discussing these interests). 
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own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of 
same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise 
of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the 
federal statute. It was its essence.”98
Under traditional rational basis review, however, courts gener-
ally do not hold the legislature to its actual purpose as long as some 
possible basis justifies the law.99 But the Court has not always been 
so deferential, even in cases purporting to apply rational basis re-
view.100 In Romer v. Evans101—also a case about gay rights, also writ-
ten by Justice Kennedy—the Court applied what some have called 
“active rational basis” review or “rational basis with bite.”102 Romer 
diverged from traditional rational basis review in two ways. First, it 
addressed only the government interests actually asserted by Colo-
rado in defense of its law; it did not, as it traditionally does in rational 
basis cases, unleash its imagination (or its law clerks) to think up bet-
ter ones.103 Second, it somewhat tightened the “fit” required between 
the government’s interests and means. 
Justice Kennedy’s Windsor opinion followed the same pattern. It 
considered only DOMA’s actual purpose, which it found to be “to 
98 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
99 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993).
100 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “perhaps the method employed must . . . be 
called ‘second order’ rational-basis review”); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2012) (Boudin, J.); United States v. Then, 56 
F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting “that the usually deferen-
tial ‘rational basis’ test has been applied with greater rigor in some contexts”).
101 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
102 See, e.g., Kevin G. Walsh, Comment, Throwing Stones: Rational Basis Review 
Triumphs over Homophobia, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1064 (1997) (noting speculation 
that Romer “contains a tier . . . of ‘active’ rational basis review”); Jeremy B. Smith, 
Comment, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should 
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on 
Sexual Orientation, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2769 (2005).
103 That would not have been hard to do. Colorado’s Amendment 2 prohibited 
anyone from raising a discrimination claim based on sexual orientation. That was far 
too broad for the state’s asserted rationale, which was to “respect . . . other citizens’ 
freedom of association.” 517 U.S. at 635. But the state could have argued that expanding 
the category of discrimination claims always raises compliance costs and enforcement 
costs, and that reducing such costs is a legitimate government interest. If the Court had 
addressed that interest, it would surely have had overtly to embrace a higher level of 
scrutiny in order to strike down the law. 
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impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all 
who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unques-
tioned authority of the States.”104 As he noted, “The stated purpose 
of the law was to promote an ‘interest in protecting the traditional 
moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws.’ . . . 
Were there any doubt of this far-reaching purpose, the title of the 
Act confirms it: The Defense of Marriage.”105 The Court also, as we 
discuss in Section 3 below, required a somewhat closer fit between 
means and ends than it often does in pure rational-basis cases.
The question, then, is what prompted the Court to tighten its re-
view in Windsor? Early commentators have emphasized Justice Ken-
nedy’s comments about the dignity of same-sex couples and their 
families: “[DOMA’s] differentiation demeans the couple, whose 
moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects . . . . And it hu-
miliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-
sex couples.”106 But each time that Kennedy mentioned dignity, he 
emphasized that this was a “relationship [that] the State has sought 
to dignify.”107 Each of the burdens that he cited deprived same-sex 
couples of state-law rights and responsibilities.108 “DOMA singles out 
a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and pro-
tection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a disability on the 
class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be digni-
fied and proper.”109 
It was not just that DOMA was mean, in other words. Its mean-
ness arose because it sought to put asunder a union that New York 
has already recognized. That was “strong evidence of a law having 
104 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
105 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 12–13 (1996)).
106 133 S. Ct. at 2694; see also id. at 2695 (“DOMA instructs all federal officials, 
and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own 
children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.”).
107 Id. at 2694 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, 
for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure 
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” 
(emphasis added)). 
108 The same can be said of the Court’s invocations of “animus” as an illegitimate 
basis for a law. See id. at 2693 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633). Justice Kennedy 
introduced that discussion by stressing that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class 
New York seeks to protect.” Id.
109 Id. at 2695–96.
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the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class [of same-sex cou-
ples married under state law].”110 Singling out a particular class for 
disapproval was an important trigger of “active rationality” review 
in Romer.111 But it was DOMA’s displacement of the state-law norms 
that raised the fear of class legislation.112 Writing for the First Cir-
cuit in DHHS, Judge Michael Boudin reached the same conclusion 
more directly: “Given that DOMA intrudes broadly into an area of 
traditional state regulation, a closer examination of the justifications 
that would prevent DOMA from violating equal protection . . . is 
uniquely reinforced by federalism concerns.”113
Federalism thus helps explain why the Court limited its review to 
DOMA’s actual purpose. It equally explains how the Court assessed 
the legitimacy of that governmental interest. BLAG’s merits brief 
in Windsor opened with the striking—and unprecedented—claim 
that “the federal government has the same latitude as the states to 
adopt its own definition of marriage for federal-law purposes.”114 
Although the brief rested this assertion on “[b]edrock principles of 
federalism,”115 the relevant section lacked a single citation to prec-
edent or other authority.116 There was a reason for that omission.
One can put the federalism objection to this interest either of two 
ways. The milder is to say that this is simply an interest that Congress 
110 Id. at 2693 (emphasis added).
111 See, e.g., 517 U.S. at 623 (citing Justice Harlan’s admonition that “the Constitution 
‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens’”) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); id. at 627 (“Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary 
class with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental 
spheres.”); id. at 633 (emphasizing “the principle that government . . . remain[s] open 
on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance” and observing that “[r]espect for 
this principle explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored 
legal status . . . are rare”); id. at 635 (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies 
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to 
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.”); see generally Jack Balkin, Windsor and the 
Constitutional Prohibition against Class Legislation, Balkinization, Jun. 26, 2013, at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/windsor-and-constitutional-prohibition.html.
112 See also 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority sees a more 
sinister motive, pointing out that the Federal Government has generally (though not 
uniformly) deferred to state definitions of marriage in the past.”).
113 DHHS, 682 F.3d at 13.
114 BLAG Brief, supra note 34, at 19. 
115 Id.
116 See id. at 30–33.
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does not have because it falls outside Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers.117 As John Marshall wrote in McCulloch, for an “end [to] be le-
gitimate,” it must be “within the scope of the constitution.”118 One 
important and often-forgotten implication of this statement is that 
while there are “necessary and proper” means to enumerated ends, 
there are no “necessary and proper”—but unenumerated—federal 
ends or interests.119 Otherwise, the Supremacy Clause would cause 
Congress’s purpose to discourage same-sex marriage to preempt state 
laws recognizing same-sex marriage because they would “stand[] as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”120 No one thinks DOMA had that effect.
Justice Kennedy described BLAG’s argument even more starkly, as 
“candid[ly]” acknowledging a “congressional purpose to influence or 
interfere with state sovereign choices about who may be married.”121 
The objection is not just that the federal government lacked an inter-
est in defining marriage, but that its attempt to do so anyway inter-
fered with the states’ choices. If Congress had constitutional power 
to define marriage, however, then that interference would be fine. In 
Gonzales v. Raich, for example, because the Supreme Court concluded 
that Congress did have power to prohibit marijuana consumption, 
California’s contrary choice was constitutionally irrelevant.122 But in 
Windsor, Justice Kennedy seems to have viewed Congress’s interfer-
ence as violating the principle he identified in Comstock, that “essential 
attributes of state sovereignty [may not be] compromised by the as-
sertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”123 
117 See, e.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 187 (reasoning that “because the decision of wheth-
er same-sex couples can marry is left to the states, DOMA does not, strictly speaking, 
‘preserve’ the institution of marriage as one between a man and a woman”).
118 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
119 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 65, at 18–20. 
120 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Against Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Thomas the Lone 
Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Lib. 63, 66 (2010) (describing obstacle preemp-
tion as “an expansive route whereby state law tort claims are ousted not by express 
statutory text, but rather on account of their implied conflict with the purposes and 
objectives of the federal regulatory scheme”).
121 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
122 545 U.S. 1, 29–31 (2005).
123 See supra note 73.
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That is why BLAG’s argument did not count as a legitimate federal 
interest.
Finally, we consider an additional interest that the government 
asserted but that the Court ignored. In the same sentence that it in-
sisted Congress has a coequal authority to define marriage for itself, 
BLAG also said that Congress “has a unique interest in treating citi-
zens across the nation the same.”124 One might question how strong 
this interest in uniformity really is,125 but it lacks the bad odor of an 
effort simply to harm a particular class of citizens. Nonetheless, the 
Court ignored it—which necessarily entailed a judgment, implicit or 
not, that it was not a legitimate federal interest in this context. Why 
not? The Court must have concluded that Congress simply lacks au-
thority to make judgments about who is married; it has no constitu-
tional option other than to take state law as Congress finds it, in all 
its variegated glory.126
3. Deference as to Fit
The Court decided Windsor primarily on the ground that DOMA 
lacked any legitimate federal interest.127 But the Court also had 
something to say about fit, complaining that “DOMA frustrates 
[New York’s] objective through a system-wide enactment with no 
identified connection to any particular area of federal law.”128 Like-
wise, the Court dismissed any possibility that DOMA might be a 
revenue measure: 
124 BLAG Brief, supra note 34, at 19.
125 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979) (rejecting 
“generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting 
state law would adversely affect administration of the federal programs”); Amanda 
Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567 (2008).
126 The Second Circuit explicitly rejected BLAG’s uniformity argument on federal-
ism grounds. See 699 F.3d at 186 (“Because DOMA is an unprecedented breach of 
longstanding deference to federalism that singles out same-sex marriage as the only 
inconsistency (among many) in state law that requires a federal rule to achieve unifor-
mity, the rationale premised on uniformity is not an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion for DOMA.”).
127 See 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (“[T]he principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law 
are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the 
Court to hold . . . that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the 
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”).
128 Id. at 2694. 
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The particular case at hand concerns the estate tax, but 
DOMA is more than a simple determination of what should 
or should not be allowed on an estate tax refund. Among 
the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations 
that DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, 
housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ 
benefits.129
And the Court’s catalog of nonsensical results under DOMA—for 
example, DOMA permitted gifts to the same-sex spouses of sena-
tors and other officials that otherwise would be illegal under federal 
ethics laws130—apparently rejected the notion that DOMA was suf-
ficiently related to any legitimate end the government might assert.
Ordinary rational basis review generally permits laws to be signif-
icantly over- or underinclusive.131 DOMA’s shortcomings in this re-
gard were extreme: applying to more than 1,100 federal laws at once, 
it was rationally related to none.132 Nonetheless, it is hard to avoid 
the impression that the Court ratcheted up the level of scrutiny. 
Judge Boudin’s opinion for the First Circuit was more explicit, con-
cluding that “[i]f we are right in thinking that disparate impact on 
minority interests and federalism concerns both require somewhat 
more in this case than almost automatic deference to Congress’s will, 
this statute fails that test.”133
It is critical to remember, however, that “ordinary” rational basis 
review is not itself part of the Constitution. It is a doctrinal test that 
the Supreme Court has developed for specific reasons—in particu-
lar, to defer to democratically elected legislatures that presumably 
have superior institutional capability to decide social and economic 
issues. Those underlying justifications for judicial deference have 
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2695.
131 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
132 Cf. DHHS, 682 F.3d at 13 (noting that “only one day of hearings was held on 
DOMA . . . and none of the testimony concerned DOMA’s effects on the numerous 
federal programs at issue”). 
133 Id. at 15. The First Circuit explicitly “[did] not rely upon the charge that DOMA’s 
hidden but dominant purpose was hostility to homosexuality.” Id. at 16. Its analysis 
turned instead on its conclusion that “Supreme Court decisions in the last fifty years 
call for closer scrutiny of government action touching upon minority group interests 
and of federal action in areas of traditional state concern.” Id. 
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complex implications, however, in a case like Windsor. Not one but 
two legislatures are in play: Congress and New York’s. It is hardly 
obvious why Congress is more worthy of deference than the New 
York legislature—both institutions, after all, have similar demo-
cratic pedigrees and institutional competences.134
To the extent that the Court required a somewhat closer-than-
usual fit between means and ends in Windsor, it may have concluded 
that Congress was not the appropriate institution entitled to defer-
ence when it comes to marriage. Justice Kennedy’s repeated refer-
ence to the states’ primacy in this area suggested that Congress does 
not enjoy the same strong presumption of constitutionality when it 
interferes with state law as when legislating on traditional federal 
subjects within its enumerated powers. We do not suggest that that 
was the only reason for a lesser degree of deference. Like Romer, 
Windsor leaves the strong impression that same-sex couples share 
many of the indicia that make racial and gender classifications sus-
pect, even if the Court seems reluctant to say so outright. Nonethe-
less, we think that, in this context, respect for federalism played a 
crucial role in dissuading the Court from deferring to Congress. 
Conclusion
At a time when the Constitution lacked a Bill of Rights, much 
less an Equal Protection Clause, James Madison invoked both fed-
eralism and separation of powers as forming a “double security” 
protecting “the rights of the people.”135 The Court echoed that lan-
guage two years ago: “The federal system rests on what might at first 
seem a counterintuitive insight, that ‘freedom is enhanced by the 
creation of two governments, not one’”; hence, “‘federalism secures 
to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.’”136 Windsor illustrates this dynamic, perhaps better than any 
case in recent memory. Edith Windsor prevailed because the state of 
New York had established her right to marriage equality in state law, 
and Congress lacked legitimate authority to interfere with that right.
134 If anything, one can argue that a state legislature is closer to the people. See, e.g., 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1484, 1509 (1987).
135 The Federalist No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
136 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364 (2011) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999); 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).
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This close relationship between federalism, liberty, and equal-
ity has often eluded even seasoned observers. Writing in the New 
York Times, Court-watcher Linda Greenhouse attacked the notion 
of a federalism-based resolution in Windsor. “Federalism tends to 
emerge from under the rocks in times of constitutional ferment,” 
Greenhouse said, and she asserted that “striking down DOMA on 
federalism grounds is a truly bad idea, and the campaign for mar-
riage equality would be worse off for it.”137 To reach that conclusion, 
however, one would have to believe that if Justice Kennedy had not 
been distracted by federalism, the Court would have issued a strong 
rights-based decision mandating same-sex marriage across the 
board. The argument and decision in Perry suggest—somewhat to 
the surprise of many observers, including us—that such a resolution 
was simply not in the cards in 2013.
It is true that, as the chief justice argued in dissent, DOMA’s fed-
eralism problems could distinguish Windsor in subsequent suits 
challenging state-law same-sex-marriage bans.138 And “while ‘[t]he 
State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance’ 
to the majority’s decision to strike down DOMA here, . . . that power 
will come into play on the other side of the board in future cases 
about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions.”139 But we 
have a hard time seeing how state sovereignty will weigh particu-
larly heavily in favor of state same-sex marriage bans. That value is 
embodied in the rational-basis test that applies to equal protection 
challenges not implicating a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and the 
states will probably be allowed to assert continuity with traditional 
moral teaching on marriage as a legitimate interest in a way that 
Congress, in Windsor, was not. The odds of striking down traditional 
state marriage laws under ordinary rational-basis review were never 
good, however.
137 Greenhouse, supra note 5. Greenhouse also impugned the motives of the 
conservative and libertarian scholars who filed the federalism brief against DOMA. 
See id. (intoning “[b]eware of conservatives bearing gifts” and comparing our 
argument to Virginia’s racist defense of its anti-miscegenation laws). We have not seen 
any post-decision columns from her lamenting DOMA’s demise or explaining how the 
gay-rights movement is worse off. 
138 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 2697.
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But federalism does not justify rejecting any of the various forms 
of heightened scrutiny proposed for discrimination against homo-
sexuals.140 Our Constitution imposes national checks on state abuses, 
just as it counts on the states to check national ones. Hence, in myr-
iad cases involving state laws challenged under heightened scrutiny 
pursuant to principles of equal protection, free speech, or due pro-
cess, federalism generally has not been a significant impediment. 
Many of those cases—involving public education,141 tort liability,142 
and regulation of the medical profession143—also implicated well-
established, traditional state functions. As Greenhouse pointed out, 
federalism was not an obstacle to the assault on Virginia’s prohibi-
tion of interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia.144 And rightly so. As 
the Court has frequently pointed out, the Fourteenth Amendment 
was always intended and understood as an incursion into and con-
straint on state sovereignty.145
Windsor recognized that federalism additionally protects liberty 
and equality when federal action threatens those rights. As Madi-
son insisted, that protection was part of the Constitution’s first-line 
strategy for ensuring individual freedom. Although we cannot de-
velop the argument here,146 we believe that the remarkable success of 
the gay-rights movement owes a great deal to our federal system. As 
Justice Kennedy recognized in another recent case, “Federalism . . . 
allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to 
the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their 
own times without having to rely solely upon the political processes 
that control a remote central power.”147 The movement for marriage 
equality has surely benefited from the opportunity to implement 
same-sex-marriage in sympathetic states and to demonstrate to a 
140 See, e.g., Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving 
the Defense of Marriage Act, Feb. 23, 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (arguing for heightened equal protection scrutiny).
141 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
143 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144 See Greenhouse, supra note 5.
145 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
146 See Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons 
from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, U. Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming Spring 2014).
147 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
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watching nation that the institution is not so threatening as some 
moral traditionalists might have feared.148 Whether or not the Court 
ever strikes down state-law same-sex-marriage bans under the Equal 
Protection Clause, Windsor removed a significant impediment to that 
broader liberalization process in DOMA. In so doing, the Court re-
minded us how our federalism can profoundly enhance liberty. 
148 See generally Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, 
Anti-Federalist, and Anti-Democratic, 570 Cato Inst. Policy Analysis, at 10–12 (Apr. 
2006), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/federal-mar-
riage-amendment-unnecessary-antifederalist-antidemocratic (articulating how feder-
alism has been beneficial to democratic debate over same-sex marriage).
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